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John Baillie on the theology of 
revelation
D. R. Valentine
What do we mean by revelation? It is a question to 
which much hard thinking and careful writing are being 
devoted in our time, and there is a general awareness 
among us that it is being answered in a way that sounds 
very differently from the traditional formulations.1
John Baillie, The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought
How does man obtain knowledge about God? This is, perhaps, the 
most enduring question of Western theology. The area of theological 
concern here is revelation. This is the subject matter of John Baillie’s 
book The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought, which was a response 
to a critical period of change in theology in Britain from the 1930s to 
the 1950s.
The book is an edited version of his Bampton Lectures given at 
Columbia University in New York in the summer of 1954. Baillie’s 
stated objective was ‘to survey the considerable body of recent thought 
and writing concerning revelation.’2 The book covers an important 
period in which views of revelation that had long been in circulation 
on the continent now made their way into British universities and 
churches. Baillie brings before his reader several dozen recent 
authors who had written on this topic, including William Temple, 
Emil Brunner, Karl Barth, C. H. Dodd, Paul Tillich, and the Niebuhr 
brothers. With differing degrees of subtlety, Baillie evaluated these 
writers and introduced his own preferences on revelation.
Revelation arose as a major issue in Europe at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century for a variety of reasons. The church was losing 
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secular power and theology had lost its pre-eminence in universities. 
Other disciplines such as sociology, biology, geology, historical 
research and textual study were growing in confidence, and organising 
themselves into societies that were keen to show their contribution. 
The influence of these disciplines on theological thinking was growing. 
There were increasing objections to both the Protestant principles of 
biblical inspiration, sufficiency and authority, and the Roman Catholic 
principle of church authority in deciding doctrine. Theologians felt 
the need to regain academic respectability: theology and philosophy 
had grown apart and, with philosophy becoming the more fashionable 
subject, many theologians now sought to situate themselves within 
the latest philosophical thinking, as Aquinas had done five centuries 
before. Philosophy had shaken off Aristotelian hegemony, and 
theology based on Aristotle’s concepts looked hopelessly out of 
date. Many theologians understood just how deep the roots of Greek 
philosophy were in Western Christianity, and tried to fill the void that 
the removal of Greek ideas had produced.
These new views of revelation were slow to gain acceptance 
in the Britain and, as Baillie notes, it was not until the 1930s that 
church leaders began to openly promote them. It is this breakdown of 
agreement on revelation that this essay traces, using as its main source 
The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought. I will analyse Baillie’s 
contribution using two themes that are prominent in the book: first, the 
Thomist distinction between reason and revelation, and second, the 
propositional view of revelation. Baillie documented and applauded 
both of these changes in the majority view concerning revelation.
Revelation v. reason
The first change had taken place through the erosion of the prevailing 
view on the distinction between reason and revelation, which Baillie 
defined in the following way:
Throughout the greater period of Christian history the question 
was not thought to be a difficult one. It was answered in 
terms of the distinction between revealed and natural or 
rational knowledge [...] this way of defining revelation as 
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communicating a body of knowledge [...] was long to remain 
unchallenged.3
Baillie regarded this as an artificial distinction whose passing would 
not be mourned:
[…] many theologians in their anxiety to establish or conserve a 
clear distinction between divine revelation and what they have 
called rational knowledge, have made this task much too easy 
for themselves by speaking as if, while the former is something 
given to us, the latter is something we create for ourselves, as 
it were spun out of our own substance; as if the former must 
be explained by beginning from the realities apprehended, 
whereas the latter could be explained by beginning from the 
apprehending mind. They have thus […] been guilty of a 
lowering of the dignity of reason in order to exalt the dignity of 
revelation; and no good can come of such procedure. The fact 
is that no true knowledge [...] can be explained by beginning 
from the human end […]4
The division of theology into ‘natural’ and ‘revealed’ elements has its 
roots in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. Following Aristotle, Aquinas 
taught that knowledge of God is transmitted in two main ways: 
naturally and supernaturally. The first occurs via the natural world as 
perceived by reason, the second is more definitely pre-packaged and 
is transmitted via exclusive channels, chief among them Scripture, but 
also including direct revelation. The first is called ‘natural theology’ 
or ‘general revelation’, the second is called ‘special revelation’. 
Aquinas emphasized man’s ability to comprehend certain truths about 
God from nature alone, while maintaining that human reason was 
still secondary to God’s revelation, as taught by the church. Aquinas 
was careful to distinguish what could be learned through ‘natural 
reason’ from doctrinal tenets, calling the truths gleaned from nature 
‘preambles to the articles of faith’.5 That is, reason may lead to faith, 
but it cannot replace faith. Aquinas undoubtedly had huge faith in 
human reason, or, more likely, faith in the reasoning ability of himself 
and other intellectuals. This binary view of reason and revelation 
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survived the disruption of the Protestant Reformation at least in part 
(despite the disagreement of those such as Luther who believed the 
human mind to be corrupt and doubted that there was any intrinsic 
value at all in ‘natural theology’). This view was reinforced by the 
second generation of Reformers, notably Calvin,6 and only began to 
break down at the end of the eighteenth century.
Turning to Scripture itself, biblical teaching on revelation is 
complex and unclear. In places, the Bible clearly teaches elements of 
natural theology, e.g. Rom 1:20, ‘For since the creation of the world 
His invisible attributes, His eternal power and divine nature, have 
been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made, so 
that they are without excuse’, and Psalm 19:1–2, ‘The heavens declare 
the glory of God, and the sky above proclaims his handiwork. Day to 
day pours out speech, and night to night reveals knowledge.’
Scripture, however, never clearly sets the boundaries of this 
natural knowledge of God and appears to contradict the significance 
of it in other places, especially with reference to the corrupt mind 
of man (e.g., Rom 8:7, 1 Tim 6:5). The Bible also contains many 
references to the significance of Scripture, but nowhere defines what 
Scripture is or relates the work of Scripture to the work of natural 
theology. The distinction between natural and special revelation is not 
found in the Bible and it, arguably, contains no explicit doctrine of 
revelation. The many references to ‘revelation’ can be put together in 
many different ways7 and the ambiguities of Scripture were settled by 
creeds and councils. Christianity moreover, came into close contact 
with Hellenistic culture, which held up the ideal of rationally certified 
knowledge as the basis for the good life:
What we may call (for lack of a better term) the “classical” 
concept of revelation is bound up with the notion of a twofold 
knowledge of God. That there are two sources of religious 
knowledge, not just one, has been virtually the consensus of 
Christian theologians throughout the history of the church, 
but there has been less agreement on what the two sources 
are and how they are related to each other. Paul’s argument 
in Romans 1–2 has commonly been the scriptural foundation 
for the discussion […]. Revelation, then, is the supernatural 
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communication of truths inaccessible to natural cognition, and 
its subjective correlate is the faith or belief that assents to it.8
This binary view of revelation has had many detractors, for example 
James Barr: 
A common modern usage has been to speak of ‘revelation and 
reason’ as the two possible forms of access to the knowledge of 
God. For Biblical study this contrast has a double disadvantage; 
firstly that this contrast and the definition of its terms are not 
drawn from Biblical thought, and secondly that it implicitly 
lumps together all human knowledge of God apart from direct 
Divine action as ‘reason’ and all human knowledge which 
depends on such action as ‘revelation’.9 
Baillie began by discussing the former view of revelation. He argued 
that revelation was a body of knowledge consisting of two types 
that were available through two complementary channels. There is 
a general revelation via reason, ‘the unaided exercise of [...] powers 
of thinking’, and a special revelation via ‘direct communication from 
God Himself.’10 These two sources of revelation are separate yet 
overlapping and complementary. The former is more active, the latter 
more passive. 
According to Baillie, the Reformation left the Thomist distinction 
intact, the Reformers being trained in the same philosophical 
tradition. He identifies Calvin’s colleague Melancthon in particular 
as a theologian who gives reason a large place in the Christian 
understanding of God – in contrast to Luther, who was very sceptical 
of human reason. These two prominent theologians represent opposite 
ends of a spectrum of positions within the Reformation movement.
The beginnings of the modern doctrine of revelation came with 
Kant’s (and Hume’s) withering critique of natural theology. Kant is 
regarded as a leading figure in the Romantic movement through his 
criticism of the rationalist theology of G. W Leibniz. Kant rejected 
natural theology and talked of faith as the instrument for knowing God: 
‘I must, therefore, abolish knowledge to make room for faith’.11 The 
‘faith’ that Kant talked of, however, was highly rational and scarcely 
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comparable with the Christian view of faith. It was, in effect, a type 
of non-speculative reason, since Kant rejected the idea of supernatural 
revelation.
The next movement offered, not an enhancement of the need 
for revelation, as one might have expected, but a third option. 
Schleiermacher and Ritschl argued that it was within the experience 
of the believer that authentic information was to be found. Like Kant, 
Schleiermacher did not accept the idea of supernatural revelation. As 
Kant found a new way between the empirical and rationalist schools 
that had dominated philosophy up to that point, so Schleiermacher 
pursued a similar task with regard to previous theological traditions:
[Schleiermacher] departed altogether from the old dichotomy 
of reason and revelation and found what seemed to be a 
middle way between the two. His theology rests neither on 
authoritatively communicated truths nor on truths excogitated 
by the speculative reason but on what he calls the religious self-
consciousness of the Christian community [...] not as a kind 
of cognition, but as a variety of feeling. In this he found few 
to follow him; but his more general contention that theology 
takes its rise in the religious consciousness, and that all its 
doctrines are but explications of this consciousness, became 
the foundation of much Protestant thought throughout the 
nineteenth century.12
Schleiermacher was, of course, influenced by Hegel, who was a 
colleague at the University of Berlin, in seeking for a ground of faith 
that was based neither on submission to revelation nor the findings of 
speculative reason. Schleiermacher’s successor was Albrecht Ritschl, 
who also maintained a ‘single source’ of faith in distinction to the 
double source of traditional theology.
Baillie, however, suggested that Schleiermacher and Ritschl had 
suppressed the idea of revelation and that this ‘represented a loss 
of the most serious kind’.13 He was, however, sympathetic to their 
motivation. Baillie argued that the idea of revelation had become 
rigidly associated with verbal inspiration, and that Schleiermacher 
and Ritschl had discarded the whole notion of supernatural revelation 
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in order to remove the idea of verbal inspiration to which (like Baillie) 
they were antipathetic. Baillie concluded on an optimistic note, stating 
that the loss of the discredited double source view of revelation was no 
bad thing, and that ‘a new and better understanding of the meaning of 
revelation is beginning to emerge.’14
What Baillie failed to mention was that there was a considerable 
diversity of views within the church during this whole historical 
period. While the Thomist view succeeded in gaining mastery in 
the official dogmas of the Roman Catholic church, it was much less 
successful elsewhere. The Reformation did not leave these views 
wholly intact, but made significant changes. General revelation is 
revelation in ‘things’ not in ‘words’, and it is not the same as natural 
theology. Natural theology is dependent upon reason, but general 
revelation is a much more limited concept, and is totally subordinate 
to special revelation. As Gerrish explains, Luther’s view of natural 
theology was a long way from that of Aquinas:
Somewhat different is Martin Luther’s twofold knowledge of 
God, general and special. If the Thomistic version of a rational 
knowledge of divine things traces its lineage back to the natural 
theology of Plato and Aristotle, Luther’s notion of a general 
knowledge of God has affinities rather with the Stoic tradition 
of natural religion, on which the Apostle Paul himself drew in 
Romans 1–2. Thomas’s rational route to a limited knowledge of 
God was open only to a few: even the things demonstrable by 
reason must be taken on faith by those of us (the vast majority) 
who lack the talent, time, or energy for rational inquiry. Luther’s 
general knowledge, by contrast, is the possession of all. And 
it is Luther’s version of the two-fold knowledge of God that is 
formalized in seventeenth-century Protestant scholasticism as 
the contrast between general revelation and special revelation: 
the distinction is not drawn, as in Thomas, between a natural 
knowledge and a revealed knowledge but between two kinds 
of revelation. There is an innate notion of God, closely 
connected with the voice of conscience, that assumes definite 
characteristics by observation of God’s self-disclosure in the 
created order, including human nature. But it is insufficient for 
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salvation because the good pleasure of God cannot be grasped 
apart from God’s communication in Scripture. […] It is not 
difficult to see why this notion ran into “serious trouble” in the 
Age of Reason.15
The propositional view of revelation
The second change that Baillie explored was the decline of the 
propositional view of revelation. To quote one of the chief actors in 
the propositional debate, Carl Henry, ‘[...] a proposition is a verbal 
statement that is either true or false; it is a rational declaration capable 
of being either believed, doubted or denied.’16 Baillie strongly rejected 
the view that the Christian faith can be represented by propositions, 
and thus took great pleasure in what he regarded as the terminal 
decline of the propositional view:
[...] it is not information about God that is revealed, but very 
God Himself incarnate in Jesus Christ our Lord. […] The 
recovery of this fundamental insight is the first thing we notice 
as running broadly throughout all the recent discussions, 
marking them off from the formulations of earlier periods. 
From a very early time in the history of the Church the 
tendency had manifested itself to equate divine revelation with 
a body of information which God has communicated to man 
[…] Behind this tendency lay a strong sense of the necessity 
of preserving unity of doctrine throughout the Church [...] 
Its natural culmination was in the simple identification of 
revelation with the total content of Holy Scripture [...] until 
finally the Roman Church, at the Council of Trent, defined that 
the whole of Scripture, as well as a body of unwritten tradition, 
had been given Spiritu sancto dictante, at the dictation of the 
Holy Spirit.17
What might replace this ‘propositional’ view of revelation? Baillie 
proffered several answers, all of them rather indistinct. As noted 
above, the propositional view was stereotyped as being ‘information 
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about God’, in contrast to revelation as the self-disclosure of ‘God 
Himself’. This sounds like a huge improvement, but quite what it 
means, or whether it really means anything, is difficult to ascertain.
The alternative to the propositional view seems to comprise a 
number of elements, which may or may not work in tandem. Firstly 
the place of the Bible has to be adjusted. The Bible now becomes not 
revelation in itself but a ‘record of revelation’, and the revelation is 
not just in the giving but also in the receiving:
It is clear that this represents a very radical departure from 
the ecclesiastical formulation which identified revelation 
with the written word of Scripture and gave to the action of 
God in history the revelational status only of being among 
the things concerning which Scripture informed us. [...] We 
must, however, think very carefully what we mean when we 
say that revelation is given in the form of events or historical 
happenings. […] The question thus arises as to whether even 
such events [...] can properly be spoken of as revelation if, in 
fact, there should be nobody to whom they reveal anything. 
[...] Surely not. We must therefore say that the receiving is as 
necessary to a completed act of revelation as the giving. […] 
The illumination of the receiving mind is a necessary condition 
of the divine self-disclosure.18
So the Bible is incomplete and needs to be understood for it to be 
regarded as revelation. Does this not also mean that any texts or 
events can serve as inspiration? Baillie affirmed this, quoting from 
Paul Tillich (‘there is no reality, thing or event which cannot become 
the bearer [of revelation]’19) and William Temple (‘all occurrences are 
in some degree revelation of God’20) as proof. 
The notion of illumination as a corollary to inspiration is not new, 
and is based on passages such as John 14:26, ‘But the Counsellor, 
the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, will teach 
you all things and will remind you of everything I have said to you’, 
and Ephesians 1:17–18, ‘that the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the 
Father of glory, may give you a spirit of wisdom and of revelation 
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in the knowledge of him, having the eyes of your hearts enlightened, 
that you may know what is the hope to which he has called you’. 
Yet this new idea of illumination seems different from the traditional 
doctrine, since this form of illumination can be applied to any event, 
idea, or text. Baillie did have some reservations about this notion of 
illumination since it suggested that a complete natural knowledge 
of God is possible without special revelation, which seems to imply 
theism. Baillie moderated this idea by adding the requirement that the 
Spirit of God must sanction events before they are revelatory:
[...] revelation is always given us through events; yet not 
through all events, but only through such as appear as God’s 
mighty works; and through no event in its bare character as 
occurrence, but only as men are enabled by the Spirit of God to 
apprehend and receive its revelatory power.21
Additionally, Baillie agreed with Temple that the fullness of revelation 
can only be given through the life of a person, so only incarnation can 
give full revelation. No evidence, however, is given for this assertion.
While the strengths and weaknesses of the propositional approach 
to Christian doctrine have been debated for centuries, Baillie’s 
portrayal of the debate between revelation as either propositional 
or non-propositional seems rather crude. He failed to examine the 
reasons behind the long tradition of doctrine in propositional form or 
the problems associated with the erosion of this tradition.22 According 
to Alister McGrath, a propositional presentation of the faith was part 
of the legacy of Aquinas: ‘Aquinas tends to regard faith as relating to 
propositions about God; Luther understands it to relate to the promises 
of God.’23 Luther’s more mystical approach, however, was not shared 
by the majority of the Protestant Reformers, and Calvin notably 
mirrored Aquinas’ method in dividing the faith into statements in the 
Institutes.
That the Christian faith can be summarised in propositions is not 
controversial. The Ten Commandments, the Law and the Beatitudes 
are all propositions that God used to summarise the faith. None are 
complete and none are designed to serve as an entrance exam, but 
doctrine has to be phrased in words, just as any meaning has to be, in 
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order to be communicated. Even events that are not verbal or textual 
have to be capable of being translated into words, and the whole Bible 
is an attempt to put into language events and thoughts that in their 
full reality do not exist in words. Paul in many places summarises 
the Christian faith in a single sentence (e.g., 1 Timothy 1:15, ‘Here 
is a trustworthy saying that deserves full acceptance: Christ Jesus 
came into the world to save sinners – of whom I am the worst’) and 
Jesus does the same (e.g., John 3:16, ‘For God so loved the world 
that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him 
shall not perish but have eternal life’). Propositions begin at the very 
start of creation – what are the words of creation if not propositions? 
Revelation in word was a correlative to revelation in nature. There 
was direct, verbal communication between God and man; Gen 2:16–
17 and 3:8 both indicate the necessity of revelation spoken directly to 
man as imparting a knowledge otherwise inaccessible. The discussion 
between Eve and the snake is basically a discussion involving the 
validity of propositional truth. Eve learns the value of propositional 
truth the hard way. The serpent suggests a rather postmodern 
interpretation of God’s command regarding the tree, but Eve soon 
learns that the command was literal. The Fall then breaks direct verbal 
contact between God and man. The lack of direct contact results in 
God using prophets and apostles as intermediaries. Revelation now 
becomes redemptive in nature, but the form is still verbal. 
The most characteristic form of revelation in the patriarchal period 
comes through the Angel of the Lord, who communicates verbally 
(e.g., Gen 16:7ff.). Jesus trains his disciples in propositional form, 
‘teaching them to obey everything I have commanded you’ (Matt 
28:20). Paul asserts the value of propositions in 1 Cor 15:3–4, ‘For I 
delivered to you as of first importance what I also received: that Christ 
died for our sins in accordance with the Scriptures, that he was buried, 
that he was raised on the third day in accordance with the Scriptures’. 
The great theologians all understood the limits of language and the 
fact that faith can only be partly represented in propositions, but 
propositions are the tool of the theologian nonetheless. Calvin likens 
the Scriptures to a pair of spectacles through which we are enabled 
to view the world with clearer vision: to see things as Adam must 
have seen them before disobedience clouded his eyesight. From this 
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perspective, revelation is not just supernaturally conveyed information 
but divinely improved vision. 
This ‘propositional view’ can doubtless be taken too far, as it may 
have been in the competing catechisms following the Reformation, but 
it seems simplistic to regard knowledge of God as being either totally 
prepositional or totally non-propositional. Divine revelation need 
not directly involve propositional content; in some cases of divine 
manifestation, the proper response may be total silence before the 
mystery and complexity of the divine, but, similarly, in many cases the 
usual way of gathering, consolidating, validating and communicating 
knowledge will be to put ideas into a verbal and propositional form. 
As William Abraham asserts:
It is sometimes thought that having propositional content 
precludes further exploration. Bultmannn captures the issue 
nicely. “God the mysterious and hidden must at the same time 
be the God who is revealed. Not, of course, in a revelation 
that could be grasped in words and propositions, that would 
be limited to formula and book and to space and time; but 
rather in a revelation that continually opens up new heights 
and depths and thus leads through darkness, from clarity to 
clarity.” [...] Bultmann is mistaken to think that grasping a 
revelation in words and propositions is incompatible with a 
revelation opening up new heights and depths. These are not at 
all mutually exclusive.24 
Baillie seemed to assume that with Bultmann, Barth and Temple the 
argument had been won. Many recent writers, such as Colin Gunton, 
have however emphasised the need for a propositional foundation: 
‘Some propositions may be merely abstract, but the kind of ones with 
which theology is and has been centrally concerned are not’.25
Conclusions
Baillie’s book suffers from a number of weaknesses. One of the most 
noticeable was that he took a non-historical approach that leaves 
the reader with little idea of how these huge changes came about. 
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According to Baillie, the consensus on revelation held until about the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. New views on revelation then 
penetrated the church rapidly through the secular philosophies of 
Hume, Kant and Hegel. This is, perhaps, a rather clumsy simplification. 
Lacking any historical analysis of revelation, Baillie portrayed current 
issues as if they were novel. His failure to relate current debates to 
historical precedents was a serious flaw. For instance, he noted ‘[t]he 
desire which is so manifest among present-day thinkers to understand 
faith as personal trust rather than as assent to doctrine […]’26 and 
then went on to quote four contemporary writers – Temple, Hebert, 
Brunner and Barth – but made no reference to previous examples 
of this dispute. Both the ‘assent to proposition’ approach and the 
‘personal experience’ approach are long-standing positions. Indeed, 
the longevity of this debate suggests that it may well be fundamental. 
Luther played a significant role in the debate, raising objections 
to propositional doctrine that were not resolved. There are long-
standing ‘experience’ traditions within both Protestantism and Roman 
Catholicism. Luther, Spener, Fox, Wesley, and Ritschl are just a few of 
the most influential names in this experience tradition.
Baillie was not even-handed in his treatment of both sides of the 
propositional truth debate. He used his rejection of propositional 
truth to dismiss the ‘verbal inspiration’ point of view, refusing to 
distinguish it from dictation theory. Baillie is, of course, generally 
very capable (even too capable) of preserving fine distinctions, so this 
refusal to understand the existence of multiple positions on verbal 
inspiration and inerrancy looks deliberate. He does not mention 
Calvin’s sophisticated writings on ‘organic inspiration’ which suggest 
a necessary interaction between God the Holy Spirit as primary 
author and the biblical writer as secondary author. Baillie names and 
quotes opponents of the theory at length but does not provide a single 
name or quote from its supporters, instead the reader has to trust the 
summaries of the position presented by the author. He regards the 
movement towards catechetical formulas as politically motivated and 
uses his distaste for catechisms to suggest that the propositional view 
as a whole was redundant. It almost seems as if evangelical writers 
had not engaged with non-propositional views until Barth began to 
espouse them.27 Barth had a profound impact on evangelical thought 
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and many evangelicals have since engaged with the neo-orthodox view 
of non-propositional truth either to oppose it28 or to seek some form of 
compromise.29 Baillie was, perhaps, rather premature in announcing 
the demise of the propositional view.
Nevertheless, Baillie was a capable writer who covered difficult 
philosophical ground. He was a sophisticated thinker, though he 
suffered from a desire to assert an ‘either-or’ when biblical theology 
seems to assert a ‘both-and’. The Bible quite evidently contains a 
definite strain of natural theology, and this need not be contrasted 
with revelation. The Bible stresses in different places sometimes the 
human and sometimes the divine origin of its text; it seems clear that 
different parts of the Bible differ with respect to these elements. The 
Bible contains both bold propositional statements and discrete lists of 
propositions that seem to sum up the entire faith, and yet it also contains 
much that is impossible to synthesise, categorise or summarise. I fear 
that Baillie’s impatience with imperfect statement and paradox meant 
that his treatment of Scripture was philosophical rather than biblical. 
The assertion that propositional knowledge is independent from and 
inferior to personal knowledge was a fixed idea of Baillie’s although 
it was much disputed by conservative theologians and philosophers.
In conclusion, it seems that the divide between systematic and 
biblical theology is very substantial, and that John Baillie is in the 
former camp. Baillie began his book by suggesting that the old 
model of revelation was perfect for schoolchildren because it was 
sensible and comprehensible.30 He implied that this very simplicity 
is a flaw, that something so logical must be artificial. Is it possible 
that Baillie had such a love of the complex that he had contempt for 
the simple? It is possible that those groups in the church who have 
done the most evangelism have also sometimes been guilty of over-
simplification, that in their enthusiasm for developing an attractive 
product they have left out any unattractive or paradoxical elements. 
Perhaps Baillie in his approach was guilty of the opposite offence, of 
denying the validity of any comprehensible and documented system 
of doctrine. Perhaps the two activities most likely to force a person to 
systematize are the urge to communicate (i.e., evangelism), and the 
requirements of leadership (i.e., the need to establish unity around an 
agreed standard of orthodoxy) – one suspects that Baillie’s approach 
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would be unsuitable for people involved in either of these activities. 
After all, what are the creeds but lists of propositions? In short, Baillie 
was over-optimistic in announcing the death of Thomist views of 
revelation, as the decades since the book was published have shown.
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